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YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO: 1 WHY IS THE
SUPREME COURT PRETENDING THAT
"A CHILD IS AN ADULT OR THAT
A BLIND MAN CAN SEE?"
2
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 2004, a fiercely divided Supreme Court3 decided
Yarborough v. Alvarado, holding that a suspect's youth is not
relevant to an "in custody" determination for Miranda
4 purposes.5
Under Miranda, suspects must be given the following warnings pnor
to any custodial police interrogation: the nght to silence, the
potential use of their statements in court, the right to legal counsel
pnor to interrogation, and the availability of free legal counsel.6 If a
suspect makes inculpatory statements while in custody without bein
given Miranda warnings, those statements are inadmissible in court.
However, statements made by a suspect deemed not in custody are
admissible even without Miranda warnings.
8
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
precedent Supreme Court cases require that juvenile defendants be
given greater procedural safeguards than adults during police interro-
gations. 9 The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's view by
refusing, in Yarborough, to consider age as a factor in determining
1. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
2. Id. at 675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 85-89 (M. Howe ed., 1963)).
3. The Court ruled five to four m favor of petitioner. The majority con-
sisted of Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas; Justices
Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 655.
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667.
6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
7 See THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 15 (1981).
8. Id.
9 Alvarado v Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 2002).
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custodial status. The Ninth Circuit endorsed a "reasonable juvenile"
standard by applying an age-modified objective test for custody
determination under Miranda.'0 In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court opted for an age-less, "reasonable person" standard
in order to provide clearer guidance to police in their law en-
forcement efforts."
By basing its decision in Yarborough on policy aimed at aiding
law enforcement, the Supreme Court missed yet another opportunity
to fulfill its professed mission to protect juvenile rights.' 2 By ruling
in favor of the petitioner in Yarborough, the Supreme Court ignored
a considerable body of its own jurisprudence, state statutes and case
law that acknowledge the vulnerabilities of juveniles in the context
of police interrogations and extend added procedural protections to
juveniles.
Part II of this Comment discusses the facts of Yarborough and
the procedural history leading up to the Supreme Court's decision.
Part III presents the Supreme Court's analysis of Yarborough,
including the reasoning behind the majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. Part IV provides an account of past
Supreme Court decisions that recognize the special vulnerabilities of
juveniles during police interrogations, and argues that the
Yarborough Court erred by failing to give these decisions the proper
authoritative weight. Part V addresses the implications of the
Supreme Court's decision in Yarborough. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the Supreme Court decided Yarborough incorrectly by
refusing to consider age as a factor in determining whether a juvenile
is in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
10. Id. at 848.
11. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666-68 (2004).
12. See CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE 197 (1998) (noting that although the Supreme Court's effort to reform
American juvenile justice policy was spurred by the well-meaning aim to
eliminate the "egregious abuses of discretionary justice in juvenile courts," the
Court showed a lack of foresight by failing to anticipate the criminalization of
the juvenile justice system and the ensuing societal ramifications); see also
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and
the Right to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105, 128 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds.,
2000) (commenting that under the direction of the Supreme Court, "the
juvenile court has become a wholly owned subsidiary of the criminal justice
system").
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II. FACTS AND HISTORY
A. Substantive Facts
On the night of September 22, 1995, Francisco Castaneda was
murdered in the parking lot of a mall in Santa Fe Springs,
California. 13 About a month later, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Detective Cheryl Comstock contacted Michael Alvarado's mother at
her work and told her that she needed to speak with her 17-year-old
son.14  Alvarado's mother and father brought their son to the
Sheriff's station as requested, but police denied them permission to
be present during his interrogation.' 5 At the outset of the interro-
gation, Detective Comstock told Alvarado that she had received
"permission" from his parents to "interview" him.' 6 Throughout the
two-hour interrogation, however, Alvarado never indicated that he
was participating voluntarily, nor did police advise him of his
Miranda rights.' f
At first, Alvarado denied any knowledge of or involvement in
the murder.' 8 But after Detective Comstock informed him that she
had witnesses who said "quite the opposite," Alvarado began to
disclose details of the murder, including the name of the shooter
(Paul Soto) and his role in helping Soto hide the murder weapon.
19
The court admitted Alvarado's statements during the interrogation
into evidence at trial.20 The trial court convicted him of second-
degree murder and attempted robbery based primarily on his
admissions made during Detective Comstock's interrogation, 21 and
13. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 655-56.
14. Id. at 656.
15. Id.
16. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S.
Ct. 2140 (2004) (No. 02-1684) [hereinafter Brief of the N.A.C.D.L].
17. Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 2002).
18. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 657.
19. Id. at 657-58.
20. Id. at 658.
21. See Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 856. The only evidence used to prosecute
Alvarado besides his admissions to detective Comstock was the testimony of
witness Manuel Rivera, who had been drinking heavily the night of the
murder, whose testimony was inconsistent during cross examination, and who
was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. Id. at 855-56. The Ninth
Circuit found that Rivera was "not powerfully credible" and as such, there was
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sentenced him to 15-years-to-life in California state prison.
22
B. Procedural History
The California Court of Appeal affirmed Alvarado's trial court
conviction.23 In both the trial court and on appeal, Alvarado moved
to suppress his statements as the product of a custodial interrogation
made without Miranda warnings. 24 Alvarado argued that his status
as a juvenile was a factor that suggested he was in custody under a
Miranda analysis.25  However, the state court did not consider
Alvarado's age as a factor when it applied the custody test articulated
in Thompson v. Keohane.26 The Thompson custody test requires a
court to first consider all the circumstances surrounding the interro-
gation, and then determine whether a reasonable person would have
felt at liberty to leave.27  The state court found that Alvarado's
interrogation was not custodial and, therefore, did not require
Miranda warnings because "a reasonable person under the circum-
stances in which Alvarado was questioned would have felt free to
leave.",
28
The Ninth Circuit granted Alvarado's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and subsequently reversed the state appellate court.
29
The Ninth Circuit held that the state court decision was an
"unreasonable application of clearly established federal law"
30
because it failed to address Alvarado's age when evaluating whether
a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave.
3 1
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)32 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court can grant
habeas corpus relief to a person held pursuant to a state court
a high probability that Alvarado's improperly admitted statements were the
"lynchpin of his conviction." Id.
22. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 659.
23. People v. Soto, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1099 (1999).
24. Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 844-45.
25. Id.
26. 516U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
27. Id.
28. Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 844-45 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 844.
30. Id. at 843.
31. Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered
titles of U.S.C.).
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judgment only if the underlying state court decision is contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court.33 The AEDPA mandates that the
standard of review in a habeas corpus proceeding be highly defer-
ential towards the state court proceedings.
34
The Ninth Circuit noted that in light of the Supreme Court's
long-standing recognition of a defendant's juvenile status when
evaluating the voluntariness of confessions and the waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination, age must also be considered a
factor as part of the clearly established federal Miranda custody
standard. 3 ' It reasoned that a minor would be more likely to feel
coerced by police tactics and conclude that he or she is under arrest
than would an adult, mandating additional "safeguards[] com-
mensurate with the age and circumstances of a juvenile defendant."
36
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it must consider
Alvarado's age in the objective determination of custodial status, and
that no "reasonable 17-year-old in Alvarado's position would have
felt 'at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. '" '37 The
38
petitioner appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
III. SUMMARY OF DECISION
A. The Reasoning of the Majority-Justices Kennedy,
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas
In determining that Alvarado was not in custody for Miranda
purposes during his police interview, the majority first determined
what the relevant clearly established federal law was. The majority
surveyed the custody test articulated by the Supreme Court in prior
decisions. 39 The custody test used by the majority asked whether in
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2264 (1996).
34. Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 844.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 850.
37. Id. at 851 (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.
99, 112 (1995)).
38. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 539 U.S. 986 (2003).
39. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-66 (2004) (citing, inter
alia, Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Stansbury v. California, 511
U.S. 318 (1994); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); California v.
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light of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, a
reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interro-
gation and leave.40  In its analysis, the majority examined the
following six commonly used indicia4' for determining whether a
suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes:
(1) [W]hether the suspect was informed at the time of
questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the
suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or
that the suspect was not considered under arrest; (2)
whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of
movement during the questioning; (3) whether the suspect
initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced
to official request to respond to questions; (4) whether
strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed
during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the
questioning was police dominated; and (6) whether the
suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the
questioning.42
Applying these factors to the facts of the case, the majority found
that certain facts weighed in favor of the view that Alvarado was in
custody, while others pointed in the opposite direction.
43
According to the majority, the following facts indicated that
Alvarado was in custody: the interrogation took place at a police
station; the interrogation lasted two hours; Detective Comstock never
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)).
40. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663 (citing Thompson, 516 U.S. at 116 and
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323).
41. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, CASES AND COMMENTARY 734 (7th ed. 2004). Because the
custody test follows a case-by-case approach, no single factor is determinative
of custody. Likewise, the Supreme Court has not espoused a rigid adherence
to any particular factual examination as part of its custodial inquiry. Id.
However, the six indicia identified by Saltzburg and Capra are almost
universally addressed by courts. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 39 and
Yarborough. For a comprehensive survey of state, federal and Supreme Court
cases discussing the circumstances weighed in determining whether
interrogations have been custodial, see J. F. Ghent, Annotation, What
Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona
Requiring That Suspect Be Informed of His Federal Rights Before Custodial
Interrogation, 31 A.L.R. 3D 565 (1970-2004).
42. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 41.
43. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664-65.
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informed Alvarado he was free to leave; Alvarado's parents brought
him to the Sheriff's station rather than arriving by his own volition;
and police denied his parents' request to be present at the interro-
gation.
44
On the other hand, the majority found that the following facts
weighed against a finding that Alvarado was in custody: the police
did not transport him to the Sheriffs station or demand that he
appear at a specific time; the police did not threaten him or suggest
that he was under arrest; his parents remained in the lobby during the
interrogation, a fact suggesting the interview would be brief;
Detective Comstock appealed to Alvarado's sense of honesty and
interest in being helpful to a police officer; towards the end of the
interview, Comstock twice asked Alvarado if he wanted to take a
break; and at the end of the interrogation, Alvarado went home.
45
Due to these "differing indications," 6 the majority concluded that
"fair-minded jurists could disagree ' 7 over whether Alvarado was in
custody and, therefore, the state court's finding that Alvarado was
not in custody did not involve an unreasonable application of the
federal custody standard. 8
Next, the majority examined whether it was proper to conduct
the custodial inquiry without consideration of Alvarado's age.49 The
majority again reviewed the Supreme Court decisions that
promulgated the Miranda custody test, ° and determined that those
opinions did not mandate the consideration of a suspect's age.51 The
majority distinguished between the Miranda custody cases and other
Supreme Court cases involving police interrogations that do consider
a suspect's age. 52 It stated that the Miranda custody inquiry is and
44. Id. at 665.
45. Id. at 664.
46. Id. at 665.
47. Id. at 664.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 666.
50. See cases cited supra note 39.
51. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 666.
52. Id. at 667-68 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973);
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963)). In Schneckloth, the Court held that
the voluntariness of a statement made under police interrogation depended on
the characteristics of the accused, including age, education and intelligence.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. A comprehensive line of Supreme Court cases
that consider a suspect's age when examining the voluntariness of juvenile
December 2005] 2303
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must remain an objective test to ensure that "the police do not need
'to make guesses as to [the circumstances] at issue before deciding
how they may interrogate the suspect."' 53 The majority contended
that the Ninth Circuit's age-modified custody inquiry of what a
"reasonable 17-year-old" would perceive created a subjective inquiry
that ignored the purpose of an objective rule-to provide "clear
guidance to the police., 54 Thus, the majority concluded that the state
court's failure to consider Alvarado's age did not provide a proper
basis for the Ninth Circuit's finding that the decision was an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
55
B. O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence to express an
additional reason for reversal: Alvarado's proximity to the age of
majority.56 Although she believed that "[t]here may be cases in
which a suspect's age will be relevant to the Miranda 'custody'
inquiry," this was not one of them because Alvarado was seventeen-
and-one-half years old at the time of the interrogation. 57 She asserted
that this posed two difficulties. First, the police will have difficulties
identifying a suspect as a juvenile when he is so close to eighteen.
58
Second, the police will have an even harder time ascertaining what
bearing a suspect's age has on the likelihood that he would feel free
to leave.59 She concluded that this was especially true in cases such
as Alvarado's, where many juveniles his age "can be expected to
behave as adults."
60
IV. ANALYSIS OF DECISION
A. Historical Framework
Since the late part of the nineteenth century, American law has
confessions and Miranda waivers are discussed infra note 66.
53. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667 (alteration in original) (quoting Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)).
54. Id. at 667-69.
55. Id. at 668.
56. Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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treated juveniles differently than adults. 6 1 The ideology behind this
disparate treatment stems from the belief that children possess
special needs, characteristics, and frailties that require greater legal
protections than adults. 62 While this shielding philosophy has been
generally adopted into most areas of the law, 63 nowhere has it been
advocated more fervently than in the modem juvenile justice
system.64 Juveniles are usually afforded more safeguards than adults
in criminal procedure, sanctions, and rehabilitation due to the
"special vulnerabilities attendant to youth."' 65
In a line of seminal cases, the Supreme Court recognized that
these special vulnerabilities are particularly pronounced and subject
to abuse in the context of police interrogations. 66 Suspecting that
such interrogations often produced coerced-and sometimes false-
confessions, 67 the Court instituted broader judicial guidelines for
reviewing the admissibility of juvenile confessions made under
police interrogation. Of these guidelines, the most significant was
the Court's adoption of a "totality of the circumstances" approach
61. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 1265, 1271-87 (2000).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1287-1355 (discussing the rationale behind giving
adolescents (presumably 14-17) lesser decision-making capacities in the legal
arenas of family law, juvenile delinquency, contract, tort, and health care).
Other well-known examples of our society's distinct treatment of juveniles
include laws limiting their ability to vote, drive, drink alcohol, purchase
cigarettes, and have consensual sex.
64. See GRISSO, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining the necessity of modifying
due process principles in the juvenile justice system "to take into consideration
the inherent social, emotional, and psychological characteristics of juveniles").
65. Brief of the N.A.C.D.L., supra note 16, at 21.
66. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (noting that the
evaluation of the voluntariness of a juvenile's Miranda waiver mandates the
consideration of the defendant's age); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967)
(emphasizing that "admissions and confessions of juveniles require special
caution"); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (recognizing that the
immaturity and suggestibility of a child compared to the police put the juvenile
on "unequal footing with his interrogators"); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601
(1948) (establishing the principle that juvenile defendants are more susceptible
to coercion under police interrogation, and that due process requires
consideration of defendant's juvenile status when determining the proper
procedural safeguards during interrogation).
67. The Supreme Court's view that juveniles are more susceptible than
adults to police coercion has been substantiated by a wealth of empirical data,
discussed infra note 102.
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that considered the defendant's age in determining whether a
juvenile's confession and waiver of Miranda rights were obtained
voluntarily or coerced by police. 68 In doing so, the Court clearly
intended to provide judges with greater power and discretion to
protect juveniles from the inherently coercive nature of police
interrogations. Furthermore, the Court also exhibited its tolerance
for-indeed, its promotion of-an age-modified inquiry for juveniles
when the stakes at hand are sufficiently high.
1. The Court "Pretends That a Child is an Adult"
Yarborough presented the Supreme Court with its first
opportunity to directly address the issue of how a suspect's youth
affects an "in custody" determination for Miranda purposes. 69 In
concluding that age should not be considered as a factor, the Court
reasoned that because none of its prior decisions applying the
Miranda custody test70 have mentioned the suspect's age, none
"mandated its consideration." 71 Thus, the Court justified its decision
by limiting the scope of its inquiry to prior Miranda custody cases
and excluding from its calculus all other aspects of Miranda
jurisprudence. For example, the Court excluded the line of cases dis-
cussing the voluntariness of juvenile confessions and waiver of
Miranda rights in the face of police interrogation.
By taking such a narrow approach, the Court disregarded "the
very values the Miranda warnings were crafted to protect" 72 -
namely the constitutional right to be free from coercive police
interrogation methods.73  Instead of confronting the real issue at
68. See Trey Meyer, Comment, Testing the Validity of Confessions and
Waivers of the Self-Incrimination Privilege in the Juvenile Courts, 47 U. KAN.
L. REv. 1035, 1041 (1999); see also Nashiba F. Boyd, Comment, "IDidn 'tDo
It, I Was Forced to Say That I Did": The Problem of Coerced Juvenile
Confessions, and Proposed Federal Legislation to Prevent Them, 47 How. L.J.
395, 412 (2004); Kimberly Larson, Note, Improving the "Kangaroo Courts":
A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles' Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL.
L. REv. 629, 644 (2003).
69. Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 2002).
70. See cases cited supra note 39.
71. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004).
72. Brief of the N.A.C.D.L., supra note 16, at 20.
73. "The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure
that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing .. "
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984). One of the fundamental
2306
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hand-that is, to what extent can the Court incorporate age in the
custodial analysis without changing it from an objective to a
subjective test-the Court resorted to rationalizing its decision on a
procedural point: the deferential standard of review given to habeas
corpus cases.74 The Court simply opted for a narrow definition of
clearly established federal law by focusing exclusively on Miranda
custody cases, and accordingly validated the state court's disregard
of age as a reasonable application of those cases.
However, the voluntariness of juvenile confession and Miranda
waiver cases prove to be highly instructive to the issues presented by
Yarborough, and should have been accorded considerable per-
suasive-if not authoritative-weight as part of the federal custody
standard. For instance, the voluntariness cases and Yarborough
contain important factual similarities. All the cases involved: (1) a
juvenile confession; 75 (2) made under police interrogation; 76 (3) in a
police station;77 (4) without the presence of the juvenile's parent or
lawyer;78 (5) and resulted in trial court convictions and protracted
sentences. 79 As custodial status was not in dispute in the voluntar-
iness cases, the Supreme Court necessarily focused its analysis on
minimum due process requirements when examining the validity of
the confessions and urging the consideration of the defendant's age.
80
rationales behind the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-
incrimination is our legal system's abhorrence of coerced statements due to
their unreliability. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 41, at 602.
74. See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663--64.
75. See id. at 658; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 710 (1979); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 6 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 50 (1962);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598 (1948).
76. See cases cited supra note 75.
77. See cases cited supra note 75.
78. See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 656; Fare, 442 U.S. at 710; In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 4-7; Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 50; Haley, 332 U.S. at 598.
79. See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 659 (seventeen-year-old received fifteen-
years-to-life as an accomplice to murder); In re Michael C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 762
(1977), superseded by 579 P.2d 7 (1978), rev'd sub nom. Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707 (1979) (sixteen-year-old committed to the California Youth
Authority for murder); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 7-8, 29 (fifteen-year-old
received 6 year sentence for making a lewd telephone call); Gallegos, 370 U.S.
at 50 (fourteen-year-old confessed to assaulting and robbing the victim;
however, the victim died three weeks after the confession and the juvenile was
convicted of first degree murder); Haley, 332 U.S. at 597 (fifteen-year-old
received life sentence for acting as lookout in murder).
80. See cases cited supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Thus, Yarborough mostly differs procedurally, not sub-
stantively, from the voluntariness cases. Accordingly, the
Yarborough Court should have reviewed the reasoning behind the
Court's consideration of age in the voluntariness cases-the relative
infirmity of juveniles during police interrogations. To paraphrase the
Ninth Circuit's observation, if a juvenile is more susceptible to
police coercion during a custodial interrogation, it follows that the
same juvenile is prone to believe that he is in custody in the first
place. 1 The Supreme Court's only response was that "facts arguably
relevant to whether an environment is coercive may have 'nothing to
do with whether respondent was in custody for the purposes of the
Miranda rule."' 82  In effect, the Court declared that the special
vulnerabilities of juveniles-recognized in the context of voluntar-
iness of confession and Miranda waiver-are somehow suspended or
magically disappear when juveniles calculate whether they are free
to terminate police interrogations and leave.8 3  The dissenting
justices in Yarborough observed that neither common sense nor the
facts of the case warranted such a leap in logic, 84 and depicted the
majority's skewed reasoning in one simple question: "why pretend
that a child is an adult or that a blind man can see?",
85
2. The Court Places Greater Import on
Law Enforcement Efforts Than Juvenile Rights
Why, then, did the Court refuse to extend the procedural
safeguard of considering age as a factor it so zealously championed
in the voluntariness cases to the Miranda custodial inquiry? One
need not read between the lines of the majority opinion to find the
answer, for it is in plain view: the Court's reluctance to interfere with
the daily law enforcement efforts of police.86 Relying on its holding
in Berkemer v. McCarty,87 the Court expressed its preference of an
objective custodial test that ensures "that the police do not need 'to
81. Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 2002).
82. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added) (quoting Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 429, 495-96 (1977)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 670-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to HOLMES, supra note 2, at
85-89).
86. See id. at 666-69.
87. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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make guesses as to [the circumstances] at issue before deciding how
they may interrogate the suspect."' 8 8  The Court feared that by
injecting the custodial test with age as a factor, it would unduly
complicate police work by creating a subjective inquiry "that would
require police to 'anticipat[e] the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every
person whom they question.'
8 9
Such reasoning is faulty on two levels. First, as the dissent
noted, youth is not "a special quality, but rather a widely shared
characteristic that generates commonsense conclusions about be-
havior and perception." 90  In other words, it would be far more
realistic for police to assume that every minor they interrogate would
feel less inclined than an adult to terminate the interrogation and
leave. The police should operate accordingly when deciding whether
or not to read Miranda rights to minors. As such, a "reasonable
juvenile" standard would not require a purely subjective inquiry into
the "state of mind" of each juvenile, but simply function as a
modified objective test that takes into account a subjective charac-
teristic shared by all minors interrogated by police.
91
Second, the Court's argument that considering a suspect's age
places additional burdens on law enforcement is without merit. A
considerable number of federal, state and municipal laws routinely
require police to determine the age of a person they are questioning
and take particular actions if the person is a juvenile.92 Even more
telling is the fact that twenty-four state jurisdictions already consider
88. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667 (alteration in original) (quoting Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,431 (1984)).
89. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430-32).
90. Id. at 674 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
91. See Brief of the N.A.C.D.L., supra note 16, at 23.
92. See Brief of the Juvenile Law Center, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 23-29, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (No.
02-1684) [hereinafter Brief of the J.L.C.]. Some examples of such regulations
include the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (adhered to by
forty-eight states), which mandates that officers determine an individual's
minority status when taking that individual into custody in order to prevent
keeping juveniles in an adult jail for longer than six hours. 42 U.S.C. § 5601
(2005). Likewise, many states have legislated per se rules requiring police to
notify an "interested adult" (legal guardian or counsel) prior to interrogating a
minor. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 1054. Finally, thousands of cities enforce
both nighttime and daytime curfews that require patrol officers to ascertain
whether individuals they encounter on the streets are minors. See Brief of the
J.L.C., supra, at 27-29.
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the suspect's age when determining custodial status. 93 In light of
these bodies of law, Justice O'Connor's concern about the diffi-
culties placed on police in ascertaining a person's age prior to
interrogation rings especially hollow.
Keeping in mind the Court's explicit commitment to law
enforcement efforts, it is clear that its policy on protecting juveniles
during police interrogations comes with a caveat: it will extend
juveniles procedural safeguards as long as doing so does not interfere
with police efforts. This is precisely the reason for the Court's dis-
tinction between the Miranda custody test and the determination of
voluntariness of confessions and Miranda waivers. The age-
inclusive "totality of the circumstances" approach towards voluntar-
iness functions as a retrospective judicial remedy, protecting the
juvenile's due process rights only after his interaction with police.
As Professor Barry C. Feld states, "[t]he 'totality' approach gives
trial judges discretion to consider a youth's immaturity, but imposes
minimal interference with police investigative work." 94
Fearing that extending the same age-inclusive "totality" test to
the Miranda custodial inquiry will act prospectively by inhibiting
certain police behavior, the Court flinched and instinctively ruled for
reversal. In doing so, however, the Court made a critical oversight.
One of the main purposes of Miranda was to create a prophylactic
rule to assist in the judicial review over police interrogation practices
because of the shortcomings of the due process "totality" approach.
95
To be afforded protection under due process, a suspect must show
that "his will was overbome" 9 6-a standard that is substantially
harder to meet than Miranda's requirement of a custodial interro-
gation.97  Thus, it is rare that a court will find that a suspect
confessed involuntarily under the due process approach, despite
evidence of unscrupulous police behavior.98 For example, courts
have consistently held that certain coercive police interrogation
tactics are permissible and do not violate due process, including the
93. BriefoftheN.A.C.D.L., supra note 16, at 28-29.
94. Feld, supra note 12, at 112.
95. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 41, at 704 (explaining the simple
prophylactic effect of Miranda: "If the warnings are not given, then a
confession is tainted").
96. Id. at 674.
97. See id. at 690.
98. See id. at 679.
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use of trickery, deception, false expressions of sympathy, and under-
stating the significance of the crime.
99
3. The Court Disregards the Prophylactic Nature of
Miranda and the Shortcomings of the Due Process Approach
The lenience the due process analysis provides police interro-
gators presents defendants with grave consequences. As Seventh
Circuit Judge Richard Posner noted, "very few incriminating
statements, custodial or otherwise, are held to be involuntary, though
few are the product of a choice that the interrogators left completely
free."'10° The inadequacy of the due process approach was corrob-
orated by a recent study. An overwhelming majority (81%) of
innocent defendants who were compelled to make false murder
confessions were convicted "beyond a reasonable doubt," despite the
procedural safeguard of a voluntariness inquiry.' 0' Furthermore,
Judge Posner's weary view of the due process test is particularly
germane in light of extensive empirical studies in the fields of
criminology, psychology, and sociology that have confirmed the
susceptibility of minors to suggestion and trickery during police
interrogations.1 2 For example, in 2004 Professors Steven A. Drizin
99. See id. at 679-80.
100. United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1990).
101. See Steven A. Dnzm & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 995-96 (2004)
(discussing how these murder confessions were proven to be false only after
trial).
102. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching
Adolescents' Judgment and Culpability, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 325, 327-29
(Thomas Gnsso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (recognizmg that certain
"psychosocial factors" such as external environment have an impact on
adolescent perceptions, judgment and decision making that limit their capacity
for autonomous choice); see also Brief of the J.L.C., supra note 92, at 16-22
(including a considerable body of recent psychological research indicating that
due to a juvenile's developmental difference from adults, a reasonable juvenile
will have a lower threshold for believing that he or she is in custody compared
to a reasonable adult. Some of these differences include cognitive and non-
cognitive capacities; different perceptions of time (or "present-onented"
thinking); "either-or" thinking; "polanzation" of adults; practicing "con-
ventional morality"; and delayed development in the frontal lobes and pre-
frontal cortex which govern decision-making, judgment, and impulse control.);
GRISSO, supra note 7, at 191-95 (summarizing his field studies showing that
juveniles demonstrated an inadequate understanding of the Miranda waiver
under police interrogation).
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and Richard A. Leo published a study addressing 125 recent
interrogation-induced false confessions to murder, including 40 by
juveniles, where DNA results later proved the suspects were inno-
cent. 10 3 The comprehensive study found that juveniles are over-
represented in the sample pool and are more likely than adults to
confess to a murder they did not commit because of their psycho-
logical inability to resist the coercive nature of police questiomng.
°4
Such data makes it clear that while the consideration of age in the
voluntariness examination is a commendable and necessary safe-
guard, it offers too little, too late, to afford a juvenile sufficient
protection from police coercion.
The significance of the prophylactic nature of Miranda becomes
apparent when viewed in relation to the due process approach. If the
facts satisfy the requirements of a custodial interrogation and the
suspect has not been given Miranda rights, a reviewing judge has the
latitude to exclude incriminating statements that would otherwise be
admissible under a due process review.105 This level of judicial
discretion is particularly crucial in cases where a juvenile has made
incriminating statements due to police trickery and deception. By
excluding age as a factor in the Miranda custodial test, the Court
took away much of judges' capacity to utilize Miranda as a pro-
phylactic tool to overturn coerced juvenile confessions deemed
"permissible" under a due process analysis.
Furthermore, the Yarborough holding provides police with a
backdoor method to circumvent Miranda's application to minors. If,
103. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 101, at 932-44.
104. See id. at 944.
105. Research shows that the increased judicial discretion provided by
Miranda has not lead to a significant rise in the number of excluded
confessions. For example, a study found that Miranda was "raised m 9% of
appeals, but only 5.6% of those clais were successful, resulting in a reversal
rate of .51% of all criminal appeals." SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 41, at
705 (citing Karen I. Guy & Robert G. Huckabee, Going Free on a
Technicality: Another Look at the Effect of the Miranda Decision on the
Criminal Justice Process, 4 CRiM. J. RES. BULL. 1 (1988)). Such findings
suggest two implications. First, they lay to rest the oft-raised criticism that
under Miranda's exclusionary rule "the criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered." Id. at 501. Second, they may lend credence to the
view that Miranda protections should be further extended, not retracted. Id. at
708 (citing Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826 (1987)).
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as the Court suggested, the facts relevant to finding a coercive
environment has nothing to do with a juvenile's custody determi-
nation, 10 6 then the police would be capable of eliciting a coerced-
confession from a juvenile out of custody. A police officer would be
able to tell juveniles they are free to leave regardless of whether they
felt that way, not read the Miranda warnings, and then use subtle
psychological ploys to obtain incriminating statements from the
juveniles. The effect of the Court's ruling is that in such situations, a
judge will be unable to incorporate the minor's age to find that the
juvenile did not in fact feel free to leave and should have been given
Miranda warnings. The judge will instead have to review the
elicited confession under the far more stringent due process test.
This scenario is not far fetched. It is essentially what took place
during Detective Comstock's interrogation of Michael Alvarado.
10 7
The majority relied on the facts that "Comstock focused on Soto's
crimes rather than Alvarado's,"' 10 8 and that instead of threatening
Alvarado with arrest and prosecution, she "appealed to his interest in
telling the truth and being helpful to a police officer"'1 9 to find that
he was not in custody. Police, however, use these two archetypical
ploys, permitted by the due process test, to coerce a juvenile to
confess. The ploys understate the significance of the suspect's crime
and appeal to the suspect's emotional disposition.110 Thus, despite
the Court's assertion otherwise, the facts giving rise to a coercive
environment are often the same facts informing the custodial de-
termination. The Court's failure to see the nexus between the two in-
106. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004).
107 Id. at 656-58.
108. Id. at 664.
109 Id.
110. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 41, at 679-80. Another detail
demonstrating that detective Comstock understated the sigmficance of
Alvarado's crime was her telling him that she was only going to "interview"
him, when m fact their exchange encompassed all the attributes of the legal
definition of an interrogation. See id. at 737-41 (describing an interrogation,
under the Supreme Court cases of Rhode Island v. Inns, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), as "express questioning" and
"any words or actions on the part of the police... that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an mcriminating response from the suspect,"
including confronting the suspect with incriminating evidence). That the
petitioner never disputed whether Alvarado was "interrogated" as required for
a finding of a "custodial interrogation" signifies that the issue was moot.
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quiries exhibits its choice to "turn a blind eye to the abuse of a
minor's vulnerabilities by interrogating officers."'
Il
Perhaps the most telling fact in the case-and one that the
Supreme Court ignored-was that Michael Alvarado asked "whether
someone should be here with [him]," ' 1 2 and he received no
response."13 Although the question cannot be deemed an unequivo-
cal request for an attorney, it surely suggests that had Detective
Comstock read Alvarado his Miranda rights, he would have invoked
his constitutional right to counsel. While Alvarado may have still
ended up confessing to his role in the murder, an attorney would, at
the very least, have helped him understand the consequences of
doing so. Yet, under the Court's ruling, Detective Comstock's cir-
cuitous route around Miranda and her methodical extraction of
inculpatory statements from a juvenile stands to become the rubric
for model police behavior.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The implications of the Supreme Court's holding in Yarborough
are troubling. First, despite Justice O'Connor's intimation that
"[t]here may be cases in which a suspect's age will be relevant to the
Miranda 'custody' inquiry," 114 the decision does not provide judges
with the guidance or power to make that determination.
Accordingly, all juveniles below the age of eighteen, regardless of
their variation in age (0-18) will be treated eually in the eyes of the
law in all future Miranda custody inquiries. 15 Thus, the question
will remain whether the juvenile felt free to terminate the interro-
gation and leave, regardless of whether the juvenile is seven or
seventeen years old. The inherent injustice in such a rule is beyond
dispute.
Likewise, the Court's ruling will have the effect of transforming
the "reasonable person" standard originally envisioned in the
Miranda custody test into the equivalent of a "reasonable adult"
standard."16  Such an outcome indicates the Court's equivocal
111. Brief of the N.A.C.D.L., supra note 16, at 27.
112. Id. at 2 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
113. Id.
114. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. See Brief of the J.L.C., supra note 92, at 2.
116. See Brief of the N.A.C.D.L., supra note 16, at 26.
2314
JUVENILE RIGHTS
commitment toward juveniles, treating them like adult criminal
defendants when formal equality works to their disadvantage,
1 17
while advocating juvenile procedural safeguards when doing so
presents an advantage to law enforcement efforts. 11 Such "selective
recognition"1 19 of juvenile procedural rights is not only unjust, it also
poses increased dangers for juveniles due to the rapid rise in the
number of juveniles being tried as adults. 120  Thus, juveniles
involved in today's justice system are up against two ominous sta-
tistics: first, they are more likely than adults to make false
confessions; 12 1 second, they are increasingly likely to be tried as
adults once they confess. 122  Because "juveniles have increasingly
more liberty to lose when they are arrested and interrogated,"'123 it
seems clear that they require more, not less, procedural protections.
Reducing the protections afforded juveniles during police interro-
gation ensures that those statistics will, at best, remain the same. A
more likely scenario, however, is that they will continue to rise.
Finally, the rationale propounded in Yarborough calls into
question the very integrity of the Supreme Court. As renowned
criminal procedure Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg recently
observed, the Supreme Court threatens the integrity of the judicial
system when it hands down decisions calculated to promote police
efficiency rather than to protect the constitutional rights of citizens:
[T]here is the tendency of the Supreme Court to pretend that
the world we all know is not the world in which law
enforcement operates. To be blunt, I contend that the
117. See FELD, supra note 12, at 105.
118. The procedures used by detective Comstock are illustrative of such
treatment. The detective secured Michael Alvarado's presence at the Sheriff's
station by contacting his parents and telling them to bring him there, yet
refused their request to be present during the interrogation. See Yarborough,
541 U.S. at 656.
119. See Hartman, supra note 61, at 1286.
120. See Lisa M. Krzewinski, Note, But I Didn 't Do It: Protecting the Rights
of Juveniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355, 365 (2002)
(noting a recent report's finding that "about 200,000 children a year are
prosecuted in general criminal courts; more than 11,000 children are in prisons
and other long-term adult correctional facilities; and, more than 2000 children
are housed in the general population of adult prisons").
121. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 101, at 944.
122. See Krzewinski, supra note 120, at 365.
123. Id.
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Supreme Court has offered opinions that strain to describe
human nature and typical behavior and rely upon beliefs
and reactions of ordinary people to fit the world that law
enforcement wishes the Court to believe is real. Whether
the Court is out of touch with the world in which most
people live or is blinking and winking to aid law en-
forcement probably does not matter. Decisions that do not
correspond to the world in which most people live threaten
to undermine the integrity of the judicial system. 
24
By holding that a juvenile's special vulnerabilities are relevant to a
voluntariness inquiry, but not to a custodial inquiry, the Yarborough
Court clearly offered a decision that "strain[s] to describe human
nature and typical behavior" in its effort to aid law enforcement.
2 5
Perhaps because it attempted to disguise its allegiance to law
enforcement concerns beneath a sea of formalistic tests, the Court
overlooked an absurd product of its holding. Although both the
voluntariness and custodial analyses employ a "totality of the
circumstances" test, 126 the voluntariness inquiry considers the
suspect's age while the custodial inquiry does not. Yet both of the
inquiries examine the same factual event-the police interrogation of
a juvenile. The irony here cannot be missed: the "totality of the
circumstances" of a single event-the interrogation--comprises
completely unequal accounts depending on whether the inquiry
examines voluntariness or custodial status. This logical conflict is
not simply a semantic oversight made by the Supreme Court, but
rather is indicative of the Court's blatant disregard of the parallel
concerns informing both inquiries.
124. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and
Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 133, 133-34 (2003).
125. Id.
126. Compare Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661 (2004) (referring
to the custodial inquiry as examining the "totality of the circumstances" of the
interrogation to determine whether the suspect felt free to leave), with Gallegos
v Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) (considering the "totality of the
circumstances" of the interrogation to determine the voluntarness of
confession), and Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (looking to the
"totality of the circumstances" surrounding the interrogation to see if a
Miranda waiver was attained voluntarily).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court erred in deciding Yarborough in favor of the
petitioner. By refusing to consider Michael Alvarado's age as a
factor in determining whether he was in custody for the purposes of
Miranda, the Court ignored an important line of its prior Miranda
decisions. The common concerns underlying the determination of
voluntariness of a juvenile's confession and waiver of Miranda
rights and the determination of a juvenile's custodial status are
unmistakable: protecting the juvenile from undue police influence
during interrogation.
The Court rationalized its distinction between the two lines of
cases by examining the Miranda custody test through an excessively
narrow lens. Although the Court masked its decision behind
Alvarado's failure to meet the proper standard of review required of
a habeas corpus proceeding, the Justices' partiality towards law
enforcement efforts over juvenile rights can be easily discerned by
the opimon. Had the Court chosen to give its prior Miranda
decisions that espouse juvenile rights the appropriate authoritative
weight, the Court would have been compelled to conclude that
Michael Alvarado was indeed "in custody", and as such, the police
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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